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South Africa has for sometime now been pursuing a national policy 
of separation of races known as apartheid. Apartheid is designed to 
physically separate, as much as possible, the Europeans (whites) from 
the non-Europeans (blacks, coloureds and Asians). 1 This racial separa-
tion extends into the labor force, education, living areas, health fa-
cilities, transportation, eating places, government, churches, and 
marriage. When apartheid has been fully developed, Europeans will only 
come into contact with non-Europeans at work under a labor-management 
contact, and on the city streets during the working day. Many analysts 
of African politics have described the racist policies of the government 
of the Republic of South Africa as a perpetuation ~f Hitler's racial 
philosophy. 
'!' The international community, since World War II, has adopted ethi-
cal standards as part oi.: its effort to protect human rights. In the 
last decade the international community, possibly as a result of the 
emergence of independent black nations in Africa and other non-white 
states, has been showing growing disapproval of the racial policy of 
South Africa. The United Nations, as a forum for the voice of the 
1A black, is a member of a Bantu or other African tribe; a col-
oured, is a mixed-blood person of white and black parentage; and, an 
Asian is one who is of Asian nationality. This is an arbitrary defi-
nition found in South African law. 
1 
2 
world's non-white opposition, and the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), the voice of black Africa, have been the staging grounds for the 
condemnation of South Africa in a mo~e to force it to rescind its ra-
cial policies and allow the non-Europeans to be represented in its 
government. South Africa's failure to respond to the demands made upon 
it by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity prompted 
the UN and the OAU to take action in the form of several resolutions to 
bring about those desired results. Those resolutions were expected to 
achieve sych results by enforcing economic, political and social sanc-
tions on South Africa and her nationals. 
This thesis will endeavor to investigate why states and inter-
national. organizations have been unable, in our international system, 
to I:"egulate human rights in the nation state. The main hypothesis of 
this thesis is that nations may continuously stress ethical standards 
in their relations with other nations and in international forums, yet 
when they are called upon to act they invaribly tend to produce amoral 
decisions, based on reasons of national interest and security. This. 
study will analyze the problems of ethics in international relations 
using selec;ted cases re!ating to apartheid, namely the work of the 
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. 
The United Nations has played an active role in trying to persuade 
South Africa to rescind its apartheid practices. Political and econo-
mic influences have been brought to bear on South Africa and political 
influences were considered in the chambers of the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, but none of these influences have been effective. 
Regardless of their personal feelings1 delega.tes, when voting, especially 
on issues involving decisions of ethical connotations,tend to vote one 
way for propagenda reasons while their states may act differently for 
reasons of national interest. 
3 
An analysis of United Nations activity to bring about an end to 
the practice of apartheid in the Republic of $.outh Africa is necessary 
to show that apartheid does not present a threat to the national inter-
est and/or security of the Member States of the United Nations; and 
this is why the enforcement of resolutions and sanctions against South 
Africa has not been effective. 
The African states and other non-white states have attempted to 
have the Republic I s racial policy declared by the Security .. Council a 
threat to international peace and security, thus involving Chapter VII 
of the Charter and making sanctions against South Africa bit1ding on each 
member nation. Due to the failure to achieve this, the African States 
and other non-white national entities have pursued their goal through 
the UN created infonnation agency, "Unit of Apartheid", t.o publicize 
the problems of racial discrimination1 hoping by this to create.greater 
awareness among the more influential .white nations. 
The Organization of African Unity is faced with a difficult task 
~fit is to be effective in its appeal for African support against 
apartheid in South .Africa. The OAU is a multi-purpose organization 
that attempts to provide political and economic direction for the Afri= 
can continent. As is the case with the United Nations, political and 
economic considerations influence the decisions of a Member State 
whether to implement approved resolutions against South Africa. Due to 
the lack of cohesion among the African states on most issues, this one 
included, the Member States of the OAU have been unable to provide the 
necessary influence required to force South Africa to consider a change 
4 
in its race policies. 
Much of the literature on apartheid in South Africa attacks the 
problem of racial discrimination from a moral-ethical point of view. 
Commentators pursuing a moralistic stand see in apartheid a threat to 
world peace and a problem for the United Nations to handle through 
Chapter VII of the Charter. This study differs from those studies in· 
that it attempts to show that South Africa!s policy of apartheid is not 
really a threat to world peace, and that the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity being powerless to have their Member 
States enforce the resolutions of the said two agencies, the Republic 
of South Africa will not experience the necessary influenc~ to change 
its policy. 
Various authors have written on the problem of apartheid. John 
Paton i!:i no doubt the most moralistic of the authors concerning apar-
theid. 2 He attempts in his book!!!!:, Long~' to shame the white man 
for supporting race discrimination by calling upon the Judeo-Christian 
·ethic for support alld moral guidance. Brian Bunting expresses. in his 
3 book, ~ Rise .2! lh! South African Reich, the imtµorality -of the 
Afrikaner-Dutch's apartheid as it is based on Hitler's supex: _human race 
theories. John Laurence's Seeds .21 Diaster4 tries to blame apartheid 
on the Dut¢h Reformed Church, the Afrikaner's church. In a more real-
istic vein, Laurence points out that the white South Africans are 
2 Atan Paton, ';rhe Long ~' ed., Edward Callan (New Yor-k., _1968). 
3Brian Bunting, The ~ of South African' Reich (Baltimore, 1966). 
4 John Laurence, The Seeds of Diaster (London, 1968)'. 
----· ....... __,,, ___ ...,..._ 
willing to fight for the right to practice apartheid, and have built 
one of the strongest armies on the African continent to do so. Colin 
and Margaret Legum believe that the "racial crisis in the Republic of 
5 South Africa cannot be resolved without international intervention." 
5 
They go on to show examples of how international intervention may be 
used effectively. Unlike other commentators, they consider many of the 
political and economic r~ifications of their plans, but still hope 
against hope that morality will win out over political expediency. 
The methodology of this thesis will be analytical and descriptive. 
South Africa's racial policy will .be analyzed in conjunction with the 
international factors which might force South Africa to rescind this 
policy, even if this is unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
The second chapter will describe the political, economic and con-
stitutional climate in South Africa. Its purpose is to s.how how apar-
theid evolved and was applied to the non-European groups, and how ef-
fective the Nationalist government has been in enforcing its policies 
upon the politically deprived non-European groups, 
The third chapter will analyze the role the United Nations has 
played in this issue. The United Nations will be studied to investi-
gate its effectiveness, its problems, and the plans that have been 
posited hopefully to make UN action on this issue the first UN politi-
cal success in the area of human rights. 
The fourth chapter will analyze the role the Organization of Af-
rican Unity is playing in trying to overthrow the white-minority 
government of South Africa, how effective is this organization 
5Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis f2.E ~ West (New 
York, 1964), p. 2. 
considering that it bases its statements on moral convictions, and 
whether the African nations are in a position to make effective their 
threats against South Africa. 
The fifth chapter will attempt to draw conclusions from these 
findings and assess the extent to which the hypothesis has been sup-
ported by the evidence. If the evidence supports the hypothesis, the 
conclusion will then be that since apartheid as a national philosophy 
is not a major threat to the surrounding area and the world community, 
then South Africa should be considered relatively free from effective 
international intervention, either from the United Nations, or from 
the Organization of African Unity. 
6 
This thesis will depend on such primary sources as the Statistical 
Yearbook, The New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and United 
---...... . . 
Nations.Official.Records of the General Assembly and those of the Se-
curity Council, and sources the writer is ready to supply but which he 
is not authorized to credit. Secondary sources will also be depended 
upon for analyses of apartheid. Finally, various professional journals 
will be used extensively for specific data--Foreign Aftairs, the ~-
.!!.!1 of Modern.African Studies, African Studies Bulletin, African~-
fairs, Africa Today, International Studies (New Delhi), and Inter-
national Orsanization. 
To summarize: the significance of this thesis is: first, it shows 
that apartheid in the Republic of South Africa is not a threat to world 
peace; and second, it shows that although the United Nations is spon-
soring verbal and physical condemnations of South African apartheid, 
the UN is an institution which still operates on the basis of moral 
authority and as such does not have the power to pass and to impose 
effective re~olutions in mo~al issues. Finally, before nations can 
ag~ee to initiate political action, a definite political threat to 
their nation~l interest and security must exist. ln the case of apar-
theid in South Africa there is not such~ political threat. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
THE'DEVELOPMENT OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA 
So\lth Africa has always practiced racial discrimination. From the 
time of the first white settlements, in 1652, the African has been 
placed in a position of subservience. The Africans and the Coloured 
(d:i,stinguished from the Africar,. by law) have held positions below the 
Europeans in All sections of South Africa. Only in the Cape Province, 
a predominately British settled area, have the aantu and the Coloured 
had a few rights unco~on to any other part of South Africa. 
Race has been the main basis of hostility between the Afrikaner 
and the Briton since South Africa became a state. The Afrikaner re• 
jected the egalitarian philosophy of the British. After the Boer War 
the B~itish assumed political and economic leadership, but the differ-
ences pf opinion never subsided. In 1908, Provincial delegates met at 
Durban to write a constitution for a self.governing colony. The most 
difficult pr0<bl.em was the issue of franchise for the Bantu. A compro-
mise was event9ally reached, and the suffrage was restricted to the 
Europeans in the Free State, the Transvaal, and Natal Provinces while 
the Cape Province retained the franchise for the non-white. This com-
promise was prc;>tected by the South Africa Act,. which provided that 
changes in the coior bar restrictions can only be adopted by two-thirds 




change •. The Union of South Africa was created, but it was without 
unity. 2 
At the time of Union the majority party was the ~-Afrikaanse 
Party (S.A.Po). The S.A.P. was a segregated party that had as its pri-
mary policy the desire to keep the Bantu subordinate to the European. 
The s.A.P. tried to unite South Africa socially and economically, but 
the Afrikaner's adamant racial stand made it impossible for the S6A.Pe 
leaders--.Louis Botha, Prime Minister, a-nd Jan Smuts, Minister of De-
fence, who was later to be Prime Minister. after Botha's death in 1919--
to unite the British and the Afrikaners. In 1924 the first Afrikaner 
dominated political party, the Nationalist Party, led by General J.B.Mo 
Hertzog, came to power. Hertzog felt his greatest threat was the 
English-speaking section which could easily absorb the Afrikaans-
speaking section. In order to deliver a crippling blow to British 
domination, Hertzog persuaded Smuts to unite the S.A.P. with the Na-
tionalist Party. In 1934 the SeA.P. and the Nationalist Party formed 
the United Party with Hertzog as Prime Minister and Smuts as Deputy 
Prime Minister. 3 This made the United Party tpe only major political 
party in South Africa. Segregation laws were passed to appease the Af-
rikaners, but the United Party did not strictly enforce these laws. 
D. F. Malan broke with the United Party and formed the Purified Nation-
alist Party in 1940 as he felt Hertzog had sold out to the'British when 
he united with Smuts to. forin the .United· Party. 
1 Leo Marquard, ~ Peoples !!!.2. Politics .2!'. South Africa (London, 
196i), P• 23. 
2Bunting, P• 21. 
3r.eonard. M. Thompson, Politics in the· Republic .2!'. South Africa 
(Boston, 1966), p. 91. 
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Malan's Nationalist Party's appeal was based on race. In the cam-
paign of 1948 the Nationalist Party hit at the United Party's apparent 
laxity in maintaining segregation. The National:i.st Party, coined the 
word "apartheid"·tq rally the Afrikaner voters to the,cause of i,acial 
separation. lt was not clear whether at the 1948 election the Nation-
alist Party had a clear cut definition of apartheid, but the word 
"a.partheid" was suff;i.cient to swit'l,g enough votes for the Nationalist 
Party in coalition with the small Afrikaner Party to become the majori-
ty in Parliament. 
After the election, the Nationalist farty set out to define apar-
theid and carry out its goals. Professor Eiselen, organizer of the 
South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and latel:' Permanent 
Secretary of the Native Affairs Department, defined apartheid in the 
classical intellectual fashion. 
Separating of the heterogenous groups, from the population 
of the country [South Africa], into separate socio-economic 
units, inhabiting separate parts of the country, each en-
joying in developing such capabilities as its individual 
members may possess to their optimum capacity.4 
Apartheid i,s in other words the separate developme:ot of each racial 
group. 
Apartheid has a three pronged objective. The first is the,problem 
of the Bantu in the cities. The Nationalist government believes that 
the cities pelong to the Europeans, and no Bantu may own property or 
vote in the cities. They may own property and vote only in their own 
reserves or homelands ca.lled Bantustans. The second is the problem of 
Bantu labor. Although South Africa depends on the Bantu for its labor 
4 
89. John Hatch,! History£! Postwar Africa (New York, 1965), pp. 88-
11 
force, yet there are certain jobs, mostly skilled, that a Bantu may not 
hold. The Nationalist government wants to areate separate developing 
places for the Bantu, but the "white capitalist" depends on cheap 
labor; therefore, the government has al19wed the Bantu to reside out-
side the city in shanty towns as a "temporary sojourner". The third 
problem is the Bantu's political rights. South Africa has prohibited 
the :Bantu f:t;'om participating in any organized political activity. 
To achieve the goals of apartheid the Nationali~t government has 
passed the Group Areas Act1 namely1 the color bar laws. These laws 
place economic and social restrictions on the Coloured and the Bantu. 
The restrictions include the following~ traveling without government 
permission and proper identification; owning property within the "white" 
areas; marrying outside their race; getting a .job listed among jobs 
their race is not "capable'' of holding. 
In spite of the Group Areas Act the Bantu have continued to emi-
grate to the cities because South Africa is an industrial country. In.-
dustry needs workers and the Bantu provide cheap labor. It is pro-
jected that by 1990 the majority of the non-white population will be 
living in the cities. 5 
The Nationalist Party revised four old laws, enacted four new 
laws, and passed two laws to change the constitution so as to make 
legitimate its apartheid policy. The 1947 Industr:l,al Conciliation Act 
was amended in 1954 and 1956. It1 in part created what is referred to 
as job reservations, another aspect of separate development. To re-
serve jobs for the Europeans, and austens;i.bly to guarantee the European 
5William R. Frye, "A Nation Torn Asunder,'' Southern Africa: ! ~ 
!£E Change (1969), p. 9. 
12 
a job in t;ime of unemployment, jobs have been restricted to different 
racial groups. The others may have what is left over. Yet South 
Africa is industrialized, it has more jobs to fill than the government 
is willing to open up for the non.,..whit;e workers. 
In 1936 the African voters were taken off the Common Roll in the 
Cape Province and given separate representation. In doing so the 
United Party followed the constitutional guidelines set down in the 
1910 constitution, In 1951 the Nationalist government introduced a 
bill to take the Coloured off the Commpn Roll. Four years of struggle 
ensued between the Nationalist government and its major parliamentary 
opposition, the United Party and the Labour Party, before the hill was 
passed by simple majority. The Act was contested before the Court of 
Appeal, which found the Nationalists' had failed to follow the constitu-
tional guidelines of the South Africa Act, and :declared the bill null and 
void. The !ct required a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parlia-
ment sitting together. In 1955, the Nationalist government changed its 
strategy. It passed two laws that did not require a two-thirds major-
ity of both Houses of Parliament sitting together. The first was the 
Appellate Division Qvorum Act, which increased the size of the Appeal · 
Court from six to eleven and required all the eleven judges .to hear any 
case concerning the val;idity of Acts o;f Parliament. 6 The second act 
was the Senate Act, which altered the constitution of the Senate to 
create the necessary two-thirds majority of both houses in,,joint ses-
7 
sion. The Nationalists were thus able to pa!:is and to enforee the 
6 Marquard, p. 94. 
7Bunting, p. 123. 
13 
provisions of the controversial bill an<J av<,>id the requirements <,>f the 
South Africa Act, thus showing that they were ready to manipulate the 
constitution to enforce apartheid. 
In 1948 the Nationalist government began its succession of voting 
8 
restriction acts to restrict or to eliminate the non-white franchise. 
In two acts, the Asiatic Law Amendment Act and the Pegging Act, the 
government withdrew Asian (Coloured) representation in Parliament and 
9 limited the representation of Indians on the Natal Provincial Council. 
The Nationalist government, in order to create apathy among the non-
whites, passed the Electoral Law Amendment Act, which provided t,hat all 
Coloured voters must have an electoral officer or a police officer 
present to witness their application to vote. 10 In this way the Na-
tionalist government was able to cancel out the potential non-white 
vote against it. The Bantu was finally disenfranchised in 1959 with 
the passage of the Bantu Self-Government Act, which abolished African 
representation in Parliament and established the Bantustans as the 
Africans' new tribal homelands. 11 
Two acts passed in the 1950 1 s helped the Nationalist government to 
curb the activities of the Bantu during the 1960 riots. The 1950 
Suppression of Conununism Amendment Bill enabled. the government to pun-
ish persons with past Conununist sympathies and to close down any 
8Ibid., P• 124. 
9rbid. 
lOibid., P• 125. 
llibid., PP• 129-30. 
14 
. 1 . d d C · · · d 12 Journa cons1 ere ommun1st-1nsp1re. The 1953 Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act prohibited anyone from protesting or supp.orting the repeal or 
13 
modification of any law. 
rhese two laws were effectively used in curbing the 1960 anti-pass 
law protests and to justify the arrest of peaceful demonstrators and 
their leaders. Anyone in South Africa who attempts to help the Bantu 
is labeled a Communist, so it is not surprising that many Bantu view 
Communism as a kind of utopia. 14 
The Nationalist government's apartheid policy did ·not .a:ffeft 'the· -, 
African population as much as it did the Coloured population~ The Col-
oured, until 1948, enjoyed a status much higher than that of the Bantu; 
he was almost a ~ocial equal if not a political equal of the European. 
With the passage of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages _Act of 1949 the 
Coloured lost his "equality"~ The Act provided for personal identifi-
cation cards that specified the bearer~s raae. lhe intent was to stop 
15 Coloured persons from "passing" as white. The Population Registra-
tion Act of 1950 stepped in to provide definitions of each of the 
three racial categories. 
A Native was a member of any aboriginal race of tribe of 
Africa. A Coloured person was not a White person nor a 
Native person. And a White person is a person who in ap-
pearance is, or who is generally accepted as a White per-
son, but does not include a person who, in appearance is 
obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a Col-
oured person.16 
1
~.s. Joshi, Unrest.!!! South Aft'ica (Bombay, 1958), p. 176. 
13Laurence, P• 101. 
l 4Ibid., p. 271. 
15Marquard, pp. 173 .. 74. 
16J h" 159 OS 1, P• • 
15 
The act fu~ther provided that on the payment of 10 pounds a person may 
challenge his classification. Such objections are to be heard by a 
. 17 
board of three appointed by the Minister of Interior. 
17 Marquard, p. 79. 
CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND APARTHEID 
$outh Africa has been at odds with the United Nations since the 
San Francisco Conference in 1945. While Prime Minister Smuts was in 
San Francisco participating in the organization of the United Nations, 
Dr. D. F. Malan, founder of the Purified Nationalist Party, was ex-
pressing misgivings about the international organization at home. He 
felt that the United Nations Charter would "enable the U.N.O. to con-
duct an inquiry into race discrimination prev~lent in his country. 111 
Prime Minister Smuts agreed that the United Nations Charter was against 
racial discrimination but pointed out, in defense of the United Nations, 
that the "UN could not interfere in matteri; essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of the state.•• 2 
Although South Africa accepted Smuts' interpretation of the United 
Nations Charter, the United Nations, as was the case in a number of 
other issues, dismissed the domestic jurisdiction argument as a reason 
to abandon the :Eight against racial discrimination. ''The case against 
South Africa is not that it is the world's only tyranny, or even neces-
sarily the worst tyranny, but that it is the world's only racial 
1Joshi, P• 103. 
2Ibid., p. 104. 
16 
' 3 t:y:ranny."· 
17 
In 1946 S~uth Africa was criticized for the f;i.rst;. time by the UN· 
for its treatment of Indians and its administration of South West Af .. 
rica; both subjects have been com1tantly on the 1:1,genda of the Ge.neral 
Assembly ever since. 
The mood in the United Nations has gradually been changing. From 
1946 to 1961 the United Nation1:1 General As.sembly wai; content with hold-
ing seminars, investigations and passing resolutions, the first being 
in 1952 concerning the racial policies of South Africa. 4 These activi-
ties bound no Member State nor made any specific request; of any, except 
to urge South Africa to voluntarily :rescind i.ts apartheid pol:i,.cies. It 
was evident by 1961 that South Africa was not going to change its do-
mestic Olltlook toward race without ~tiffer condemnations and resolu-
tions. 
The United Nations became increasingly aware of its failure to 
persuade South Africa to abandon its racial policies with non-committal 
condemnations of apartheid and decided to take more drastic·steps in an 
effort to force South Africa to change its policy of apartheid. The 
newly independent African nations began clamoring for collective reso-
lutions against South Africa, 5 but there were a few countries afraid to 
initiate action against South Africa for fear of destroying the effec-
tiveness of the United Nations. 
3Colin and Margaret Legum, p. 261. 
4cecil v. Crabb, Jr., Nations 2:!l ~ Multipolar World (New York, 
1968), P• 507. 
5Colin Legum; Africa:, A H;andbook t;o the Continent (New York, 
- ..,,._ -· 1962), P• 388. 
18 
Mr. Nygese, of the Congolese delegation (Leopoldville) arguing in 
favor of stiffer action against South Africa, said that the Organiza-
tion must take firm and.effective measures. He expressed the hope that 
those delegations which believed that South Africa could be convinced 
by vague pronouncements would now realize that more effective means, 
6 
such as economJc pressure, would have to be used. 
Mr. Plimpton, the delegate from the United States, had argued 
against the Congolese delegation's contentions by saying that the.fail-
ure to implement such a resolution could seriously weaken the authority 
of the United Nations--a consequence which all Members, and particular-
ly the smaller nations, would wish to avoid. "It might be recalled 
that the decline of the League of Nations had been largely precipitated 
by that body's inabi{ity to enforce sanctions. 117 
Yet the growing' agitation of the newly independent African nations, 
coupled with the Sharpville incident of March, 1960,8 overshadowed any 
objections there may have been against economic or political sanctions 
by the General Assembly. A~ the Sixteenth Session of the General As-
sembly the African and Asian countries, supported by many other states, 
put forward a proposal for economic embargoes against South Africa. The 
proposal did not secure the required majority in the General Assembly. 
At the Seventeenth ,Session of the General Assembly, a resolution was 
passed recommending economic restraints by Member States against the 
60fficial Records .2!, ~ General. Assembly, Seventeenth Session, 
19.0ctober 1962, Agenda Item 87, p. 36. 
7 . 
Ibid., P• 38. 
8rhe Sharpeville massacre was an incident in which many protesting 
Bantu were .. shot while peacefully demonstrating against the Pass Laws. 
19 
Republic of South Africa. Resolution 1761 (XVII) provided that Member 
Statesi . 
(a) Break.off diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
South Africa or refrain from establishing such re-
lations; 
(b) Close their ports to all vessels flying the South 
4\.frican flag; 
(e) ~nact legislation to prohibit their ships from 
entering South African parts; 
(d) Boycott all South African goods, and refrain from 
exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, 
to South Africa; 
(e) Refuse landing and passage facilities to all air-
craft belonging to South Africa and compan~es 
registered under the laws of South Africa. 
Th'roughout the United N·at-ions I hi'story;· the· failure of economic res-
olutions has been due ·to the.reluctance of'the members to enforce the 
resolutions. A table compiled for the Nineteenth Session of the Gener-
al Assembly comparing the trade statistics of Member States with South 
Africa for 1962 arid 1963 shows that many nations from the continents of 
Europe, America, and Asia chose to ignore resolution 1761 (XVII) and 
10 have not curtailed trade relations as suggested. 
Sot.1th Africa occupies a unique position in the international eco-
11 
nomic community; it mines and sells over half of the world's gold. 
South Africa is rich in other minerals that are necessary to the West-
. ern·'Power:s for defense and those that are necessary to the private sec-
tor for the manufacturing of consumer goods. In addition, several 
Western countries have invested heavily in business and industry 
throughout South Africa, since its economy is not only profitable but 
9 ' General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII), 6 November 1962. 
10 · See Appendix, Table I, pages 57-62. 
ll h 1 T ompson, p. o 
20 
also stable. South Africa has a lower tax on dividends at source (7\ 
per cent) than her trading partners. Some examples are: Australia, 
whose tax on dividends at source is 15 per cent; Germany, 30 per cent; 
Switzerland and the United States, 38 3/4 per cent. 12 
Those countries abiding by the resolutions have stopped trading 
with South Africa, only to leave a vacuum in the South African market 
that was readily filled by nations not so keenly opposed to South 
Africa's racial policies. It is clear, therefore, economic advantage 
has become more important than the moral conscience of nations. 
An effort to provide greater pressure on South Africa brought 
13 ' 
about resolution 1899 (XVIII), which calls on Member States to stop 
selling petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa. Such a boy-
cott could not only be more easily enfo:i:-ced, but would also have had a 
greater effect on South Africa, since the Republic imports all its oil 
needs. An effective embargo of foreign oil supplies would progres~ 
. 1 h 1 11 f f i ' ' ' S h Af · 14 sive y at a orms o econom c activity in out rica. 
Resolution 1899 (XVIII) like the previous resolution was not ef-
fective. South Africa continued to import quantities of oil from the 
United States and Great Britain, but the majority of its crude oil came 
15 from Iran. Again the reason why the Member States refused to comply 
was economic, and the United Nations again was unable to force South 
Africa to change its racial policy. 
12colin and Margaret Legum, p. 125. 
13 General.Assembly Resolution 1899 (XVUI), '13 November 1963. 
14 
· Colin and Margaret Legum, p, 286. 
1511South Africa's Need for Oil," Petroleum Press Service, XXXIV 
(December, 1967), p. 456. 
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Despite existing resolutions against South Africa, foreign busi-
nessmen have invested large sums of money in South Africa and have con-
tinued to show full faith in its economic and political future. Such 
businessmen as Mr. Charles Englehard, chairman of the American South 
African Investment Company; Dr. z. L. Rabid, director of export promo-
tion for Barton and Sons Limited; and a leading West German financier, 
Dr. Hermann J. Abs, have gone on record in support of South African 
economy, discounting the seriousness of its political situation. 16 
It was recognized at the UN in 1963 that in order for economic 
resolutions to work every Member State would have to stop trading with 
South Africa. 17 With the African nations pressing for stiffer action 
to be taken by the United Nations against South Africa, the decision 
was made to further isolate South Africa from the international com-
munity by its expulsion from the specialized agencies and the denial of 
financial or economic assistance by international financial institu-' 
tions. As a result, three resolutions were passed during the Twenty-
second and Twenty-third sessions of the General Assembly to stop t.he 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development from loaning money to the Republic of South Africa, 
and for the specialized agencies to withhold assistance of any kind to 
h b 1 b d d h 1 f h .d 18 t e Repu lie unti it a an one t e po icies o · apart ei • 
160fficial Records 2.f the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, 21 
September-22 December 1965, Agenda Item 36, pp. 19-20. 
170fficial Records£!. the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, 17 
September- 17 December 1963, Annexes·, Agenda Item 30, p. 47. 
18General Assembly Resolutions 2307 (XXII) 13 December 1967; 2326 
(XXII) 17 December 1967; and, 2426 (XXIII) . 18 December 1968. 
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The Republic of South Africa has been expelled from active member-
ship of all the international specialized agencies, with the exception 
of the International Telecommunications Union, whose provisions do not 
allow for expulsion of members, and the Universal Postal Union, whose 
members voted against expelling South Africa on 9 July 1964 by a vote 
of 58 to 56 with 5 delegations absent. 19 
This limited isolation has failed to persuade the Republic of 
South Africa to change its racial policies. Yet it cannot be said that 
South Africa does not fear this attempt to isolate it. Even though 
its economy is booming, South Africa fears isolation. Due to this 
fear, South Africa has begun a new foreign policy that is intended to 
counteract the political objectives of the United Nations. This for-
eign policy is called the "Outward-Looking" policy. Its intention is 
to extend goodwill to the .black independent nations directly north of 
South Africa and to create buffer states as a protection from guerilla 
incursions into South Africa's northern borders. Mr. ·Basie Van Rens-
burg, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, pointed out that to allow the 
I 
isolation of South Africa "could be playing directly into the hands of 
our enemies because they wish to isolate South Africa in the hope that 
it might lead to military and violent interference in our domestic af-
f ai :rs. 1120 
South African officials quickly point out that the ivoutward Look-
ing" policy does not mean that South Africa intends to rescind its 
19official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, 
1964-1965, Annexes, Agendallem 12, p. 99. 
20official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, 
1968, Supplement 25, p. 88. 
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policies of apartheid. 
Malawi is the first independent black natJon to which South Africa 
has applied successfully its "Outward-Looking" policy. The two nations 
, 21 have entered into cooperation as members of the African continent. 
South Africa has extended aid to Malawi to help develop its Civil Ser-
~ice,22 and )riedical aid in the form of conferences and advice. 23 Malawi 
seems to be greatful for the South African aid, and there is no sign 
that this independent biack nation has been offended.by South Africa's 
racial policy. The Ivory Coast also has indicated a willingness to 
enter into discussions with South Africa. 
The United Nationsi efforts to halt South Africa's policies have 
not stopped with the unsuccessful economic trade embargoes. In recent 
years·the United Nations has passed and implemented resolutions to edu-
cate the world about apartheid. 
In 1966 the General Assembly considered the establishment of a 
''Unit on Apartheid" to study and disseminate information concerning 
racial discrimination, especially apartheid. This action was imple-
mented through resolution 2144 (XXI) on 26 October 1966. 24 
The ''Unit ori Apartheid"· has been active in its role to expose 
apartheid. through films, publications and the UEie of the ma.ss ·media •.. 
The "Unit on Apartheid" is reported to have considered a radio network 
to be known as Radio Free Africa • 
. ... .. . , 
., .... ,.;,.,,., 
. : , :: , 211.'Yo:rrste:r" Stresses·. Cooperation?' News Ftoni. South Afriea, 
Listed), (May 26, 1970), p. 1. - -
. • ' :· .. .: '.i.' .. ' ~ :. : ,' ;::-._~. •' ' - ' , ."' ' ! --; ··.·· ·1 ,'··: :· ,' :-; .• •• :~. _"1°_ 
(No :VoL 
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· 22 ·.: . · 
. :1'Klopper .ori', Aid to Ma'lawi," (August 6, 1969), p. 3. 
. '' ... 
24 General Assembly Resolution 2144 (XXI), 26 October 1966. 
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The United Nations, in an effort to further the peaceful fight 
against apartheid and help those injured by it, in 1968 created a Trust 
Fund for: {a) persons persecuted for taking part in the campaign 
against apartheid; {b) relief for their dependents; (c) education for 
dependents; and, (d) relief for South African refugees. 25 Financial as-· 
sistance'. for refugees of apartheid has been provided for since 1964, 
but few countries have contributed financially to help these people. 26 
The 1968 resolution has not fared much better. 
The United Nations' most overt action in its twenty-four year 
struggle to encourage racial desegration in South Africa has come with-
in the last few years. The United Nations has indirectly recognized 
through several resolutions the guerilla activity of South African na-
tionals and other people opposed to the purpose of the governments of 
South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. These resolutions 
were intended to condemn anti-liberation action by the Republic of 
South Africa, such as the Rivonia political treason triaL General 
Assembly resolution 1881 (XVII) asked that South Africa free its polit-
ic.al prisoners and stop all political trials. 27 When South Africa 
failed to heed these UN resolutions, the General Assembly produced two 
more resolutions# Resolution 2394 (XXIII) condemned the use of a capi-
tal punishment against people who opposed apartheid in South Africa, 
Rhodesia, and Nambia (South West Africa). 28 Resolution 2396 (XXIII) 
. .2,5,G.e.n,eral Assembly Resolution 2397 (XXIII), 2 December 1968. 
26General Assembly Resolution 1978 (XVIII), 16 Deceinber·'.19630 
27 General Assembly,. Eighteenth:·.sessiori:,: p. 10. 
28General Assembly Resolution 2394 (XXIII), ·.26 November 1968. 
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called upon all Member States and independent organizations to give 
moral, political and material assistance to the South African libera-
tion movements. The resolution also asked that the members of the.se 
movements caught by South African or Rhodesian officials be treated as 
prisoners of war according to the 1949 Geneva Convention. 29 
Feeling isolated and faced with the recognition of the cause of 
the underground groups, South Africa has increased its military expen-
diture. South African officials have recognized the existence of a 
Hfifth column" within their country. In 1962 Major-General Sir Francis 
De Guingand said, 0 As regards a fifth column, I hope we have sufficient 
internal :forces to deal with that •1130 In 1963 the Verwoerd government 
took the view that South Africa was faced with "a black invasion from 
31 
:the north.uv For the 1964-65 fiscal year, Parliament has been asked 
to approve a defense and security budget of $362.7 million, which is 
more money than was spent by South Africa on defense during World War 
II. 32 
The Republic of South Africa has been working on plans to become 
self-sufficient in the manufacture of weapons for its own defense. Be-
fore South Africa can attain self=sufficiency it must have the coopera-
tion of other countries to supply the weapons it needs and to license 
South Africa to make certain weapons within its borders. 
The United States announced during the Eighteenth session of the 
29 General Assembly Resolution 2396 (XXIII), 2 December 1968. 
30colin and Margaret Legum, p. 204. 
31Ibid., p. 205. 
32 Robert Conley, 11South Africa Building Military Forces to A 
Peak, n New York Times (March 20, 1964), p. 4. 
General Assembly thatg 
It has adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding 
the sale to the South African Government of arms and 
military equipment, whether from Government or Commer-
cial sources, which can be used by that Government to 
enforce apartheid either in South Africa or in the Ad-
ministration of South West Africa. It expects to bring 
to an end the sale of all military equipment to the 
Government of South Africa by the end of 1963.33 
Great Britain has had difficulty in stopping the sale of arms to 
South Africa due to extensive arms contracts which come under exten-
34 
sions to the Simonstown Base Agreement. The sale of arms to South 
26 
Africa has now ceased although the present British Government is recon-
sidering this matter. 
South Africa does get arms, ammunition and military vehicles from 
other countries, mainly Belgium, France, and Italy. South Africa is 
now building military aircraft which at one time were made from com-
35 ponents imported from Britain and Italy and assembled in South Africa. 
South Africa since 1968 has had its own guided missile, whi.ch was part-
ly financed by the French government wi.th technical aid suppli.ed by a 
French electronics firm. 36 The Defense Minister, P,. Wo Botha, announced 
to the South African Senate on 12 March 1968 that South Africa had de-
veloped its own napalm bomb, and that the country was self-sufficient 
33 General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, p. 9. 
34Eric A. Walker,! History of Southern Africa (London 9 1957), p. 
573. The Si.monstown Agreement is a defense agreement concluded by Great 
Britain with South Africa in February, 1921, that guarantees to all 
ships of the British navy at all times the use of the British-built na-
val dockyard at Simonstown under the protection of South Africa. 
350fficial Records of ~ General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, 
17 October, 1967, Agenda Item 31, p. 123. 
36Report A/7625 of Special Committee to the General Assembly ap-
pearing in the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, p. 82. 
in a wide range of weapons such as rifles, mortars, ammunition, gre-
. nades, smoke bombs, aerial bombs, and explosives and apparatus. 37 
27 
France has sold submarines to South Africa and trained the men who 
will man them. But South Africa refuses to remain dependent on other 
countries for its naval supplies and, as a result, has begun talks with 
Mr. Cornelis Verholme, Chairman of the Verholme United Shipyards of the 
Netherlands. The latter reported that his company plans to construct a 
shipyard near Cape Town that will be able to build ships weighing 
300,000 tons of dead weight and would be capable of building submarines 
38 
also. 
The Security Council has also joined the other United Nations 
bodies in trying to make South Africa abandon its racial policies. Al-
though a late-comer to such efforts, its resolutions have never gone 
beyond suggestions. Since the African nations' summit conference in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiop:i,a in 1963, which produced the Organization of Afri-
can Unity {OAU), the Security Counci 1 has been under pressure. to either 
take action to expel the Republic of South Africa from the Uni.ted Na-
tions, or invoke Chapter VII of the Charter to make all resolutions 
passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly mandatory to 
Member States to enforce the resolutions. 
Expulsion has to many African delegations bee.n the ideal action 
to take against South Africa, since it has for; years refused to heed the 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly or the Security Council. 
The Ghanaian delegation was the first to introduce such a resolution at 
37Report A/6864 of Special Committee to the General Assembly 
peari.ng i.n the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, p. 124. 
381b1."d., 123 p. ' • 
ap-
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the Special Political Committee's 327th meeting. The Congolese delega-
tion (Leopoldville) supported such action, since South Africa had re-
fused to obey the many resolutions asking it to cease its practice of 
apartheid. 
The movement for the ouster of South Africa from the United Na-
tions appeared at first to be widely supported by many of the small 
"neutral" nations. The great powers and a few of these nations did not 
go along. Mali, an African nation, during the 336th meeting argued 
against the expulsion of South Africa. Mali's delegate, Mr. Toure, said 
thatg · 
••• expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations would 
not be enough to induce that country to abandon its policy 
of apartheid. The delegation ••• believed that South Africa 
would be more sensitive to economic sanctions, since its 
expolitation of African labor was the basis of South Afri-
can economic interests.39 
Mr. Plimpton of the United States pointed out that expelling South 
Africa from the United Nations would take her away from the one place 
that the full weight of world public opinion could be brought to bear. 
He said that apartheid could not be terminated by diminishing South 
African contact with the outside world, but only by expanding South 
Africa's contacts. 40 
France ably capped the discussion by drawing an analogy between 
the United Nations and a family, Mr. Millet said that the UN was not a 
club where one chose one's friends, but a family, and one does not 
choose one's relations. Thus, South Africa would be least likely to 
pay attention to the wishes of the United Nations after being expelled 
r 
39 General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, p. 52. 
4olbid., p. 38. 
29 
f . 41 rom 1.t. 
The debate to expel the Republic of South Africa took place one 
year before the debate to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter in order to 
make all UN resolutions binding on Member States. This debate occurred 
in the Security Council between July and August, 1963. Security Coun-
cil Resolution 181 (1963) 42 did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, 
nor did it express the belief that apartheid in South Africa was a 
threat to international peace and security. The Security Council meet-
ing marked the beginning of collective action on the part of African 
nations to stop verbal condemnation of apartheid and demand concerted 
action by the United Nations to end apartheid in South Africa, yet it 
43 failed to produce such action. 
This irritated the delegates representing the African nations, who 
worked hard to point out the danger South Africa presented to their 
continent. They denounced the military buildup within that country. 
Mr. Quaison-Sakey of Ghana at that meeting tried to show the anxiety 
felt by the African nations due to the South African arms build up. He 
quoted President Nkrumah's address to the Ghanaian Parliament on 21 June 
1963~ 
Have they asked why so many small arms should be needed 
for the protection of South African whites? For what 
purpose do these States consider that aparthied in South 
Africa requires aircraft capable of, and designed for, 
carrying nuclear rockets and weapons? The 'Buccaneer'· 
aircraft, with its limited range, ·and about which there 
has recently been controversy in Britain, is not such 
as could be employed against say, the Soviet Union or 
41Ibid., p. 55. 
42security Council Resolution 181 (1963), 7 August 1963. 
43colin and Margaret Legum, p. 236. 
the United States of America. Against whom on the African 
continent, then, are they intended to be employed? There 
are questions all the independent African States are asking 
and would like to have answered. 44 
Mr. Quaison-Sakey pointed out, 
One need not be a military strategist to see the threat 
that this huge military build-up in South Africa is posing 
to the African States. One aspect of this is the likeli-
hood that this will generate an arms race development, be-
cause, as we all know, African States today need all their 
resources for their economic and social development to 
raise the standard of living of their peoples. 45 
30 
The African delegates also expressed displeasure with the Western powers 
who were continuing to trade with South Africa and supply it with mili-
tary equipment without any apparent care as to what the weapons were 
intended for. 
The United States, Britain and France were not willing to accept 
the argument that the arms build-up or the racial policy of apartheid 
in South Africa were reasons to believe that South Africa's action was 
a serious danger to international peace and security. Mr. Stevenson, 
the United States delegate, pointed out that the impasse with South Af-
rica should be dealt with in the way the impasse between the United 
States and the Soviet Union over the nuclear test ban treaty was 
46 broken. That is, that the US and the USSR came to a mutual agreement 
concerning the testing of nuclear weapons after months of talking 
rather than other less satisfying actions that may not have resulted in 
the mutual agreement. 
44s . C · 1 ecur1.ty ounc1. , Official Records, S/PV, 1052, Eighteenth Year, 
2 August 1963, p. 7. 
45Ibid. 
46Ibid., p. 17. 
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The Western powers' argument was not satisfactory to the African 
nations but, not wishing to risk a permanent member veto, the delegates 
did not press their demand that the phrase "apartheid was a serious 
danger to international peace and security" be inserted, nor did they 
force the issue of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter. 
After the resolution with the appropriate changes demanded by the 
Western nations was adopted by the Security Council (9-0-2, France and 
Great Britain abstaining), Mr. Yost, the United States representative, 
expressed his thanks to the sponsors for changing the wording of the 
eighth preambular paragraph from "is seriously endangering internation-
al peace and security" to "is seriously disturbing international peace 
d . ..47 an security. The United States further stressed that the resolu-
ti.on did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, as that Chapter VII 
"does not speak in terms of disturbances of the peace, even serious 
ones, but only of actual threats to the peace or breaches of peace or 
f . ..48 acts o aggression. Mr. Yost practically took the UoS. out of the 
resolution when he closed his address with the observation that the 
49 United States did not consider paragraphs two and three as being 
47 . . Security Council, Official Records, S/PV, 1056, Eighteenth Year, 
7 August 1963, p. 6. 
48Ibid. 
49 ( 2) Calls upon the Government of South Africa to abandon the po-
licies of apartheid and discrimination, as called for in Security 
Council Resolution 134 (1960), and to liberate all persons imprisoned, 
interned to subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the pol-
icy of apartheid; 
(3) Solemnly calls upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and 
shipment of arms and ammunition of all types and military vehicles to 
South Africa. 
32 
d 5o F d . ' h - h' . man atory. ace ,wit t 1s, the African delegations chose to bide 
their time, allowing the West to make verbal concessions to them on the 
. 51 question of apartheid. 
The United Nations has continued to actively condemn apartheid 
through non-binding recommendations. Although some Members have not 
given up their efforts to encourage other nations to support the econo-
mic resolutions against South Africa, the emphasis has now shifted to 
propaganda pressures on South Africa~ The "Unit on Apartheid11 is now 
operating to inform the world about South Africa's domestic racial poli-
cies and about the United Nations' efforts to persuade South Africa to 
abandon its apartheid policies. 
The United Nations has no"t been as successful as the African dele-
gations hoped it would be when they asked for more stringent condemna-
tions against South Africa. Failing to accept apartheid as a threat to 
thei.r security, the Member States still prefer moral condemnations to 
serious action. South Africa seems to have won a little more time to 
prove that: 
(a) separate development--apartheid--is the right answer 
for South Africa; (b) apartheid's internal contradictions 
will prove it unworkable and that other solutions, such 
as racial federation of a qualified franchise, can then be 
investigated; or (c) in any case South Africa's economic 
boom will eventually force integration. 52 
50 Security Council, Eighteenth Year, p. 7. 
51Colin and Margaret Legum, P• 238. 
52 Frederick Hunter, "Quite Simmers in South Africa," Christian 
Science Monitor, June 9, 1970, p. 6. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ORGANIZATION Of AFRICAN UNITY AND APARTHEID 
The African unity or Pan-African movement has existed since the 
1940 1 s. For a time it was the special project of Ghana's former Presi-
dent Kwame Nkrumah, but now Pan-Africanism comes in many forms which 
are usually based on regional concepts. For example, the Union of Afri-
can States and Malagasy (UAM) (the Brazzaville twelve and Monrovia 
group) was comprised of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, 
the Central African Republics, Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Cameroom, 
Gabon, Senegal, Malagasy, and Mauritania. The Monrovia group was a 
conservative group believing in equality among nations, non-intervention 
in internal affairs and respect of sovereignty. 1 The Casablanca group 
was a small group comprising of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the 
United Arab Republic. The Casablanca group was a radical, leftward 
2 
oriented, anti-colonial and socialistic group. 
In 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia invited the African 
heads of state and foreign ministers to Addis Ababa to discuss African 
unity. Two plans were discussed. The first was Nkrumah's plan of the 
continental government of Africa; the second was Emperor Haile Selas-
sie's plan to organize a body that would function as the foundation for 
1Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," Governing 2:E. Black Africa. 
Marion E. Doro & Newell M. Stultz, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p. 321. 
2 Ibid. 
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African unity by acting as a mediator of disputes and as council for 
the settlement of African problems. 
34 
African unity was not the only question to discuss at Addis Ababa. 
Other important questions to Africans were considered and proposals 
were submitted in an effort to find a solution to the problem of white-
minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia and colonialism in 
the Portuguese territories of Africa. Addressing himself to these 
problems Haile Selassie called on the delegates to rememben 
Our liberty is meaningless unless all Africans are free. 
Our brothers in the Rhodesias, in Mozambique, in Angola, 
in South Africa, cry out in anguish for our support and 
assistance. It would be betrayal were we to pay lip 
service to the cause of their liberation and fail to 
back our words with action ••• 3 
Although the Addis Ababa conference was only intended to discuss 
problems, it nevertheless did produce a resolution condemning the racial 
activities of South Africa and charged the thirty-two independent Afri-
can nations to: (a) boycott South Africa and Portuguese trade; (b) 
break off diplomatic relations with South Africa and Portugal; (c) deny 
the use of African airport facilities to ships flying Portuguese or 
South African flags; and directing itself to the Great powers, called 
on them to, (d) stop direct or indirect support of Portugal and South 
4 Africa. Presid~nt Sek6u Toure of'Guiriea, realizing that nations are 
ready to produce verbal and written moral condemnations but not enforce 
them, cautioned the Member States not to pass resolutions they did not 
intend to enforce, for such an act would be fatal to the 
3Haile Selassie I, 1vTowards African Unity, 11 The Journal of Modern 
African Studies I (September, 1963), p. 282. 
4Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited. 
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organization. 5 A Sanctions Bureau was formed to follow up the matter 
and to bring to the attention of the Member States any failure on their 
part to enforce any or all the resolutions of the OAU, considering that 
like most organizations whose membership is made up of sovereign states, 
the enforcement of the OAU resolutions was left up to the governments 
of the Member States. 6 
The Organization of African Unity also established a special com-
mittee to coordinate liberation movement activities aga.i.nst the colonial 
d . . . h Af . 7 an racist regimes in sout ern rica. Various African states volun-
teered training camps, men and supplies to the liberation movement. A 
budget of $4,200,000 was pledged, but in the long run only $675,000 was 
received, which was contributed by Algeria and Nigeria. 8 
One might say that the expectations were high and the spirit of 
the new African organization great, but in spite of that, Emperor 
Selassie was left to establish a secretariat and convert the "paper or-
ganization into a working entity" without being provided the money to 
pay for the approved project. 9 
Only one part of the four part 1963 resolution was enforced and 
that was the denial of the use of African air space to South African 
6 John Markakis, "The Organization of African Unity,iv The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, IV (October, 1966), p. 151. 
7 Southern Africa includes South Africa, Rhodesia, Angolia, and 
Mozambique. 
8 Clyde Sanger, '~Toward Unity in Africa," Foreign Affairs, XLII 
(January 2, 1964), pp. 277-78. 
9 Jay Walz, "Africa's Unity Charter," The~~ Times (May 27, 
1963), p. 8. 
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companies. This prohibition increased the operating costs of South Af-
10 
rican companies by 25 per cent. At the conference at Lagos in 1964, 
the African delegates were so pleased with the results, however mi.nimal 
they might appear, that they began preparing another resolution for 
consideration by the Heads of State and Government Assembly at its Cairo 
meeting in July, 1964. The resolution was to provide for the banning 
of all shipping and air companies which continue to serve South Africa 
from overflying Africa and using African ports and airports •11 
Such a rise in costs may not have meant much under normal opera-
ting conditions, but South Africa during this time was undergoing an 
economic crisis. It was suffering from a large outflow of capital as 
well as budgetary inflation, credit inflation, and protectionist in-
flation all at the same time. 12 That is why the ability to aggravate 
economic conditions in South Africa was considered to be an OAU accom-
plishment. 
Haile Selassie, the "father" ·of the OAU, admonished his colleagues 
for having overlooked the more important aspects of the organization. 
In a speech in Cairo, he stressed his desire to see the OAU become re-
sponsible for building Africa into a modern continent through coopera-
tive deeds such as a connnon economic market that would break down trade 
barriers and coordinate plans for internal as well as international 




is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited. 
1
~orman Macrea, nA Survey, 11 The Economist, CCXXVIL (June 29, 
1968), pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
13 
on racial problems. 
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The Assembly of Heads .of State and Government paid no attention to 
the Emperor. Although they did reject the resolution formulated by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers in Lagos, they did resolve to place an em-
bargo on the sale and delivery of petroleum products to South Africa. 14 
They, for all practical purposes, dismissed President Sekou Toure's 
(Guinea) cautions about the passage of resolutions that could not be 
enforced and seem to have accepted President Apithy's (Dahomey) excuse 
for failure to fully implement the 1963 resolution. He had told the 
Assembly: 
Our half failure is partly due to the fact that we adopted 
them without preparation. We did not take the time to ex-
amine our statistics for foreign trade with Portugal and 
South Africa, and to arrange for other markets to replace 
them.1 5 
~ Ghanaian Times had an eye on the future when it said after the 
Foreign Ministers meeting at Lagos that 11 ••• nine months of post Addis 
Ababa has proved beyond a doubt that the OAU is inadequate for ••• poli-
ti.cal dec.isions in Africa, 1116 since 1965 was the year of reckoning for 
the OAU and its fight against the blacklisted southern African states. 
Perhaps the existence of the Liberation CoI!llllittee was too much of 
a temptation for antagonistic African statesmen to overlook the propa-
ganda advantages available from the presence of refugees and training 
13Walz, "African Leaders Assail Two Nations, 11 The New York Times 
(July 19, 1964), p. 3. 
14Ibid. 
15Writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited. 
Also see Appendix, Table II, pages 63-65. 
16Ibid. 
camps in many African states and they readily used them in the propa-
ganda war among the African states. That is perhaps why, President 
Sekou Toure said, "The OAMCE was created with the unconfessed aim of 
· 17 
weakening African unity." 
38 
Regardless of their real motives, nine members of the Union of 
African States and Malagasy (UAM) decided not to attend the OAU con-
ference to be held in Accra, Ghana in October, 1965. The reasons they 
gave for the boycott was that Ghana was training refugees to return to 
their homelands to overthrow the existing governments. 
At a Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, called especially to 
settle this dispute, Ghana refused to be intimidated by its antagonists. 
Ghana's spokesman, Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, denied the existence 
of any training camps in Ghana, but he reassured the delegates that 
Ghana would take the necessary precautions to insure the safety and 
happiness of all delegates in Accra. 
Despite Ghana's profuse assurances of safety, the governments of 
the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta, and Dahomey refused to send 
delegates to the Ac.cra meeting because of reports that Ghana was har-
boring refugees trained in Red China to be launched in attacks against 
the government of Niger. 
The eighteen OAU delegations met to decide, among other things, 
what role the OAU would play if Rhodesia unilaterally declared its in-
dependence of Britain. The decision of the OAU was to warn Britain and 
the white-minority government of Rhodesia that political and economic 
measures would be taken if the Rhodesian government were to make a 
17Ibid. 
18 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
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With its reputation on the line, the OAU had to consider the fis-
cal side of its responsibility. With the Secretariat of the OAU in ar-
rears by $2.5 million, 19 and half of the thirty-six members not paying 
20 
at all and six paying only part of their dues, the organization never-
theless failed to provide funds for the Secretariat or the Liberation 
Committee. The Liberation Committee was organized to provide direction 
for the freedom fighters in their war against apartheid and the Portu-
guese colonies in southern Africa. 
The Liberation Committee, as well as the OAU itself, was viewed at 
the time as a panacea for African troubles, with high expectations for 
a quick victory over the white governments of southern Africa. Such 
expectations were echoed by Sir Ubabukar Balewa of Nigeria, who said, 
"as long as parts of Africa suffer under the humiliating yoke of col-· 
onia.lism and apartheid, our freedom and independence will not be com-
21 plete. 11 Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, was heard to say that the 
Liberation Committee should set a deadline for the colonists of Mozam-
bique and Angola and the racists of South Africa and Rhodesia to be out 
of southern Africa or "African armies should intervenelti_.in ''self-
defense. ,v 22 
18Ibid. 
19110yd Garrison, "Meeting in Accra Winds up Quietly,u ~ New 
York Times (October 27, 1965), p. 9. 
20 Lloyd Garrison, "Debts Endanger African Group," The New~ 
Times (October 25, 1965), p.~22; and "Africans Seek Unity Formula,'ti 
The New York Times (October 24, 1965), Sec. IV, p. 4. 




./ But the LibJration Committee became, instead, a political football 
~t.J/ '.ii 
""t'hat was kicked ~bout by different African nations, which were either 
·~l ~ 
:r' left out of the qommittee or had other reasons for wanting to obstruct 
;; 
action. f Ghana w~s never satisfied with the activity of the Committee 
and accused it of being inefficient and, therefore, refused to support 
1't f' · ' 11 23 1nanc1a y. The Union of African States and Malagasy sought to 
discredit the Liberation Committee by charging that it not only en-
deavored to overthrow the governments of the white-minority countries, 
but also of black independent nations with which it did not agree. 24 
It is surprising therefore to see the individual delegates,; as·:.the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government closed in Accra, rejoice at 
the apparent progress of the summit conference. l'rime~ Minister Margai 
of Sierra Leone said that the conference was the first real working 
25 
conference. President Sekou Toure of Guinea applauded the progress 
made with respect to resoultions on South Africa, Rhodesia, and the 
Portuguese colonies~ 26 The general atmosphere was one of optimism de-
spite the lack ·Of attendance and the problems faced by the organiza-
tion. 'l'he OAU as well as the Liberation Committee continued to have 
financial difficulties, 27 and the Liberation Committee was in need of 
reconstruction. 
Rhodesia declared its independence of Britain on 12 November 1965 
23Arnold Rivikin, "The Organization of African Unity," Current 
History, XLVIII (April, 1965), p. 240. 
24Ibid. 




and the OAU had to decide how to implement the political and economic 
resolutions taken in October. The Council of Ministers met in December 
and it decided to serve an ultimatum on Britain to solve the Rhodesian 
crisis or be faced with a mass breaking of diplomatic relations by all 
African nations. Ultimately only nine of the thirty-four members did 
so. Having failed to pursue effective measures the responsibility for 
the enforcement of sanctions on Rhodesia passed from the OAU to Britain. 
The Liberation Committee proved to be both inept and incompetent. 
Its purpose was to work to overthrow the colonial powers in Mozambique 
and Angola and the white-minority governments of Rhodesia and South 
Africa, but in planning its strategy the Liberation Committee seemed to 
forget that there were black independent nations whose economic exist-
ence depended on the blacklisted southern African countries. Malawi, 
as explained in the previous chapter, was willing to trade Mith those 
countries, since its economic well-being depended on it, regardless of 
how such action was received by the other independent African states. 
Zambia, on the other hand, would have preferred to adhere to the recom~ 
mendations of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, 
but was unable to do so because of its dependence on Rhodesia, Mozam-
bique and South Africa for trade and transportation. One must not for-
28 get that Zambia is the second largest copper producer in the world, 
but is landlocked and depends on the railways of Rhodesia and Mozambi-
que to get its copper to a seaport; thus Zambia is at the mercy of two 
countries it has publically ctitized. 
28i>ierre,-Albin Marter and Pierrer Chassing, eds., Africa 69/70 
(New York, 1969), p. 195. 
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A few days before Rhodei;;ia I s Unilateral Declaration of Indepen.:. .· 
dence, an Anglo-American aviation team studied the possibility that 
Zambia might be able to handle a Berlin-type airlift in the case of an 
emergency, but it was found that Zambia's two airstrips were not suf-
ficient to cope with such traffic. 29 
When Rhodesia did announce its independence the United Nations in 
1966 instituted an oil embargo that~not only cut off Rhodesia's oil 
supply, but also that of Zambia. It was at this time that the OAU 
recognized Zambia's economic problems and established a Solidarity Com-
mittee to help Zambia in its hour of need. 30 Whether Zambia can rely 
on the Solidarity Conunittee remains to be seen, Zambia has been busy 
working on alternate actions. 
In the latter half of 1965, Zambia applied to the World Bank for a 
loan to build a railway to Tanzania for its copper shipments, but was 
31 turned down. aritain and Canada volunteered to survey a possible 
route for a railway, but made no promise to build the 1:i,ne. In 1967, 
Red China agreed to build the railroad for 100 million. pounds interest 
32 free. The Chinese are now building this railway. 
The Council of Foreign Ministers met in March, 1966, to try to 
patch up the differences between those states that:had followed the De-
cember resolution and broken diplomatic relations with Britain and those 
29writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited. 
30Anirudha Gupta, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Orgapization of 
African Unity," .International Studies (New Delhi) IX,. (July, 1967-
April, 1968), P• 61. 
31writer is ready to supply the source which cannot be credited. 
3
~artel and Chassing, p. 195. 
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that had not. They came to a decision to draw up a resolution to pro-
vide a way for the nine states to re-establish relations with Britain 
without losing face. Four delegations withdrew from the meeting on the 
eve of the discussion of the resolution--Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, and 
the UAR. 33 The following morning three more delegations left--Somalia, 
Algel;'ia and Kenya--with the Mauritanian delegation remaining but not 
participating. 34 The walkouts shook the remaining delegations, who 
later-decided to strike the offensive resolution from the record. It 
was decided to pass two more moralistic resolutions concerning Rhodesia 
and South Africa, and not to ment:i,.on the failure of the December, :·_1965 
1 . . 35 reso ut1on again. 
The omission of a formal mention of the 1965 resolution to break 
relations with Britain did not help the status of the OAU nor did it 
mend the antaganistic feelings among the delegations for the up coming 
November meeting. Two new resol~tions were approved concerning Rho-
desia and South Africa. 'l'hese established the Solidariaty Coi:nmittee, 
resolved to fight colonialism and racism, deplored the increase in 
36 trade with South Africa by France, Italy, West Germany and Japan, and 
finally resolved to continue the fight against racism and colonialism. 
The record shows that while t;he OAU and other African groups can 
freely talk about ethical actions against; South Africa, they are 
33Drew Middleton, "More Countries Quit African Talk," The New York 
-----Times (March 5, 1966), p. 2. 
34Ibid. 
35 
"African Parley Mutes Rhodesia Stand, 11 The New York Times (March 
---6, 1966), p. 9. 
36lbid. 
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unwilling t.o take political actions that conform with their moralist 
intentions. The efforts of the OAU to imitate the UN with similar:. 
resolutions has magnified the problems both of them have had to face 
since 1948, nations have tended to be very moralistic at international 
forums, but when the time comes for them to initiate actions, the na-
tions suddenly become am.oral and they seek action based on national 
interests and security and naturally fail to enforce their promises. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis tested the hypothesis that nations will not resort to 
effective pressure against other nations unless the policies of those 
nations threaten their national security. This being the case we 
should not expect effective action from an international organization 
to force the Republic of South Africa to rescind its apartheid policies 
in the foreseeable future. In testing this hypothesis, we considered 
apartheid at both the United Nations and the Organization of African 
Unity. We have seen how certain Member States have attempted to rally 
support for sanctions against South Africa by charging that apartheid 
is a threat to world peace and security. They then asked the United 
Nations and the Organization of African Unity to apply their legal, 
economic and political influence against the Republic of South Africa 
in order to compel it to change its racial policies. In each case the 
results were very minimal. 
The Republic of South Africa is an independent nation which has 
accepted the Charter of the United Nations. As a Member State ~he Re-
public has certain rights and obligations, one of which is the "domes-
tic jurisdiction" -clause which exempts the domestic actions of a Member 
State from international scrutiny and could in fact be intrepreted to 
support the Republic's right to practi~e apartheid. Article 11, para-
graph 7 of the Charter states: 
45 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter ••• l 
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South Africa has as such considered all these resolutions condemn-
ing it or establishing embargoes by the United Nations as being ultra· 
vires of the United Nations's Charter. The Organization of African 
Unity's Charter has a provision similar to that of Article II, para-
graph 7 of the United Nations Charter: "The Member States.,. solemnly 
affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: ••• (2) 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states ••• 112 Since the 
Charters of the UN and the OAU do not give them jurisdiction over the 
internal affairs of a sovereign nation, it could be argued that they do 
not have legal grounds to sanction South Africa on its apartheid poli-
cies. 
The Republic of South Africa may be within its legal rights to de-
termine what domestic policies it wants to follow, even if this includes 
a racial philosophy, nevertheless the world connnunity has established 
through the Universal Declaration of Ruman Rights norms it wants the 
nations to follow, in order to protect and guarantee certain elementary 
freedoms to all peoples. Because this does not lie within the area of 
political necessity for the survival of the national interests, nations 
have used such Declarations to acquire approbation from other nations 
in the international connnunity, even if these Declarations still await 
ratification. As a result, the United Nations and the Organization of 
1united Nations Charter, Article llt paragraph 7. 
2organization of African Unity Charter, Article ll, paragraph 2. 
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African Unity have passed various resolutions with the purpose of ex-
erting economic and political pressure on the Republic of South Africa. 
These resolutions have partially isolated the Republic in the economic 
and conununication fields. South Africa's gold exports have insured for 
it continµed trade with Western nations regardless of th~ economic 
sanctions and of the differing views on racial issues. Western nations 
have preferred to continue trade relations while diplomatically attack-
ing South Africa's policy of apartheid. Some of the African states 
which voted to cease trade with South Africa, have failed to do so 
either because of their dependence on South Africa or the lack of con-
cern once outside the halh of the United Nations or the Organization 
of African Unity. Trade statistics given before have demonstrated that 
many OAU members continued to trade with South Africa. Due to the fail-
ure of the UN and the OAU economic embargo resolutions 1 South Africa 
does not seem to feel the need to change its racial policies. 
The conununication embargoes have fared better. They almost iso-
lated South Africa from the world community as witnessed by its ouster 
from many of the specialized agencies as well as its denied use of many 
Af_rican sea ports and air facilities. Even though the various embar-
goes have not succeeded in their primary goal, namely to force South 
Africa to rescind apartheid, they have made that country feel the pinch 
of isolation. This prompted South Africa to increase its military 
spending and to embark on a new foreign policy vis-a-vis many inde-
pendent African states, which seems to be somewhat effective. 
Within the United Nations, at the beginning, numerous resolutions 
were passed which merely condemned South Africa's racial policies. 
These resolutions appeared to many United Nations Member States to be 
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sufficient to persuade South Africa to abandon the apartheid policy. 
As more African nations became independent during the 1960 1 s pressure 
was exerted within the UN to apply sanctions against South Africa. 
These sanctions based on ethical considerations were.designed to iso-
late South Africa from the world, weaken it militarily and with econom-
ic.and social pressure force South Africa to give up its announced 
policieso Although the resolutions gained substantial support in the 
OAU, and the UN General Assembly and qualified approval in the Security 
Council, with many Western nations voting in favor of them, the results 
have been meager and ineffectual. Instead of a decrease in South Afri-
can trade, there has been an increase, instead of a decrease in South 
Africa's military power there has been an increase, and South Africa is 
not so isolated from the world. As a result, the white Nationalist 
government of South Africa has not been receptive to United Nations and 
Organization of African Unity pressure to modify its racial policy, and 
the nations of the world have not backed their moralistic arguments 
with effective actionso 
Throughout the history of this conflict the African states seems 
to have operated along William Zartman's model. He suggests that when 
a weaker group of nations, either individually or collectively, comes 
into contact· with stronger nations, collectively or individually, 
usually colonial or former colonial powers, the weaker nations will be-
little the power theory as a basis for international ;relations and 
stress the idealistic theory of justice. 3 Since Africa as a continent 
3 . 
William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in Inter-
national Relations," Governing in Black Africa, eds., Marion E. Doro 
and Newell M. Stultz, (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p •. 33t •. 
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does not possess necessary power for action it has espoused this 
theory of justice as a means to bring about its ends vis-a-vis South 
Africa and the other African problems. To the Africans, this theory of 
justice proved its validity in a practical manner when the European 
colonial powers withdrew from the African continent with relatively 
little actual pressure or power applied to them. 4 This may explain 
why Africa as a unit rejected the classical means of reaching an end 
through the adaptation of the "might makes right". theory to the "right 
makes might" theory, only to be shattered when the more powerful states 
continued to use the power theory in their relationship with weaker 
African states. As a result, the ideological outlook on international 
relations has not helped the OAU in its battle against apartheid in 
South Africa. Because of the unrealistic nature of this philosophy, 
the OAU. has lost much of its integrity, especially during the Rhodesian 
crisis. The OAU attempted to apply the "right makes might" notion 
toward solving the lfillegal" independence of Rhodesia. Becat,tse the 
OAU accepted Britain as solely responsible for solving the problem, the 
OAU presented itself as an organization too weak to cope with the 
problems it was organized to settle, and so jeopardized it~ integrity 
in the world community. 
This thesis has studied the actions of two international organi-
zations to overcome a common problem. The methods used by nations--
the ethical-moralistic approach, although proven again and again to be 
ineffective, seems to be the only method that can rally the support of 
all the Member States. The main problem is that nations pursue a 
4Ibid., P• 332. 
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policy entrenched in the national interests, and consequently ethical-
moralistic resolutions end up as resolutions with no effective backing 
to enforce them, 
What about the days ahead for the United Nations and the Organi-
zation of African Unity? The evidence gathered shows that both organi-
zations must overcome many problems before effectiveness can be 
achieved. The United Nations cannot assume the responsibility of a 
world government and inherit police powers without the approval of all 
Member States. If being a world government is the purpose of the UN, 
its attempt at the legislation of moral standards has not been success-
ful and will continue to fail as long as an ideological bloc is not 
able to control the enforcement of those resolutions by, each member 
nation. 
The big power unaminity the Security Council, has made the Council 
the best UN organ to be entrusted with international peace and secur-
ity. As shown in this thesis, the Security Council realizing the 
limitations of the world community is not ready to concede that apar-
theid in South Africa is a threat to international peace and security, 
and as such has refused to adopt measures that would purge South Africa 
of its racial policies. 
The Organization of African Unity has not been effective because 
of its failure to maintain unity among its members and because of its 
clear weakness as a world force. The Organization of African Unity has 
therefore competed wi,th the United Nations in its moralistic approach 
and the actions it has taken have alternated between weak economic boy-
cotts and lack of political enthusiasm. 
South Africa will only reconsider its racial policies once it 
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faces a world community, whether the UN or the OAU, in"which the ef-- -
fective·and influential members honestly oelieve it" is their national 
interest to have South Africa ch4nge its policy. 
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TABLE I _ 
DIREC.TION. OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE-REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AnICA*_ 
Republic of South Africa: IMPORTS--COUNTRIES: _ 
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Table I (Continued) 
1963 1962 
Country of Origin Rand per cent Rand per cent 
Bahrain 9,565,680 0.8 9,343,577 0.9 
Iraq 1,804,160 0.2 874,020 0.1 
Iran 31,063,582 2.6 36,736,892 3.7 
Pakistan 12,771,389 1.1 17,019,071 1. 7 
Ceylon 13,254,567 1.1 12,879,598 1.3 
Thailand 663,178 0.1 860,161 0.1 
British Borneo 628,222 0.1 502,006 0.1 
Hong Kong 7,496,571 0.6 4,493,652 0.4 
China 1,815,913 0.2 962,911 0.1 
Japan 56,420,036 4.7 41,464,245 4.1 
Other Asia 18 2135,649 1.5 13 2884,491 1.4 
Total, Asia 168,195,467 14.0 153,927,627 15.4 
OCEANIA 
Australia 12,419,872 1.0 13,739,463 1.4 
New Zealand 1,738,651 0.1 1,646,703 0.2 
Other Oceania 11 2 766 ... 29 2780 
Total, Oceania 14,170,289 1. 2 15,415,946 1.5 
Total, All 1,199,992,210 99.8 1,000,380,610 99.9 
Total excludes the optional ship stores, parcel post, and customs value of emigrants' effects. 
Summary of Imports and Exports of South African produce (excluding space) according to countries of desti-
nation, reflecting the percentage that each country hears to the total export or import, along with com-
parative figures for the corresponding period of the previous year. 
Republic of South Africa:· EXPORTS--COUNTRIES: 
AFRICA 
United Arab Republic 401,548 627,337 0.1 V1 \C 
Table I (Continued) 
1963 1962 
Country of Origin Rand per cent Rand per cent 
Congo (Leopoldville) 6,137,725 0.7 7,473,293 0.8 
Angola 1,137,462 0.1 1,021,245 Ool 
Rhodesia & Nyasaland 75,142,477 8.3 84,670,008 9.7 
Mozambique 13,705,665 1.5 12,131,767 1.4 
Mauritius 3,480,756 0.4 4,173,849 0.5 
Kenya 3,850,870 0.4 5,474,023 0.6 
Other Africa 3 2302,793 0.4 4 2 032 2629 ...Q.:1 
Total, Africa 107,368,296 11.8 119,604,151 13.8 
EUROPE 
Norway 1,957,284 0.2 2,704,552 0.3 
Sweden 5,066,322 0.6 5,562,867 0.6 
Denmark 784,544 0.1 1,457,992 0.2 
Ireland 3,278,218 0.4 1,669,173 0.2 
United Kingdom of Great Britain & 
North Ireland 272,028,414 29.9 241,933,604 27.8 
Belgium 38,566,483 4.3 37,866,598 4.4 
Netherlands 24,526,870 2.7 25,180,720 2.9 
Federal R~public of Germany 49,114,892 5.4 42,759,300 4.9 
France 31,422,934 3.5 31,306,238 3.6 
Switzerland 5,009,194 0.6 5,713,683 0.2 
Austria 1,470,311 0.2 3,045,867 0.3 
Portugal 3,403,088 0.4 1,591,357 0.2 
Spain 5,948,381 0.7 3,843,817 0.4 
Italy 49,322,960 5.4 44,258,626 5.1 
Finland 903,683 0.1 1,568,963 0.2 
Eastern Germany 2,082,418 0.2 1,627,694 0.2 
Poland 2,436,761 0.3 2,122,388 0.2 
Czechoslovakia 770,670 0.1 581,463 0.1 
"' 0 
Table I (Continued) 
1963 1962 
Country of Origin Rand per cent Rand per cent 
Albania 648,955 0.1 . . . . . . .. 
Greece 1,074,442 0.1 1,053,302 0.1 
Other Europe 676 2512 0.1 1 2021 2927 0.1 
Total, Europe 500,493,399 55.1 456,870,159 52.1 
AMERICA 
Canada 13,290,111 1.5 10,385,104 1.2 
United States 80,575,740 8.9 78,107,917 9.0 
Mexico 4,768,949 0.5 379,474 0.1 
~ Colombia 430,757 ... 660,778 0.1 
Chile 451,670 ... 530,431 0.1 
Argentina 1,213,783 0.1 1,578,994 0.2 
Other America 1 2806 2 913 0.2 1 2 934 2649 0.3 
Total, America 102,537,923 11.3 93,577,347 10.8 
ASIA 
Turkey 1,330,435 0.2 1,012,280 0.1 
Israel 2,838,517 0.3 2,886,724 0.3 
Aden 583,517 0.1 339,664 ... 
Iraq 451,486 ... 802,044 0.1 
Iran 613,268 0.1 2,448,111 0.3 
Pakistan 794,592 0.1 1,545,140 0.2 
Ceylon 1,224,099 0.1 1,768,885 0.2 
Thailand 483,629 0.1 468,493 0.1 
Hong Kong 8,539,854 0.9 8,627,925 1.0 
China 4,263,359 0.5 938,346 0.1 
Japan 70,518,246 7.8 72,394,653 8.3 
Republic of Korea 11, 746 2 478 1.3 13,749 2 906 1.6 
Total, Asia 103,517,129 11.4 107,474,422 12.5 
0\ 
I-' 
Country of Origin 
OCEANIA .. 
Australia 

























Excluding the optional ship stores, parcel post and customs value of emigrants' effects. 
GRAND TOTAL 827,673,292 91.1 788,289,330 
E_er cent 








TOTAL TRADE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES* 
Countr~ 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 Currency 
-
Central African Republic 
Imports;> 18 12 9 6 11 11 million francs 
Exports:; 39 43 77 77 64 104 CaFoA. 
Chad 
Imports 9 9 .5 10 12 million francs · 
Exports: 3 0 0 0 117 C.F.A. 
Congo (Brazz.'aville) 
Imports.· 90 121 95 49 46 48 million francs 
Exports·! 152 167 317 329 297 379 C .... F.A. 
Congo (Leopoldville) 
Imports 225.1 ... 4856 5302 6339 3911 million· francs 
Exports: 23.5 
·e • • 2531 3942 6857 1946 
Ghana thous. new cedis 
Imports 0 0 0 4, 0 1 ::(1963-67) 
Exports, 0 0 0 0 8 0 thous. pounds 
( 1962) 
Ivory Coast { 
Imports 55 41 . . . . .. ... . .. million francs 
Exports' 684 779 D O 0 e e a. ... ... C.F .. A. 
\\ 
Kenya 
Importsi 3266 2433 23 0 2 0 thous. pounds l ;, Exports· 1103 1884 -1 0 0 \• ! ... 
:J 

























Table II (Continued) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 
126.1 135.9 118.9 ... 
14.4 29.3 37.8 . . . 
857 1092 1991 
577 565 557 
30772 32262 34561 27272 
1249 2273 11790 1309 
1.0 ... . .. 1.1 
10.8 ... . .. 3.7 
5 3 16 3 
13 19 39 21 
211 81 59 20 
113 240 341 389 
9 1 0 . .. 






























Table II (Continued) 
Country 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Tanganyika 
Imports 415 181 7 0 
Exports 837 551 0 ... 
'fogo 
Imports 22.8 12.3 15.6 0.1 
Exports 19.6 25.3 27.0 o.o 
Tunisia 
Imports 1.0 1.1 ... . .. 
Exports 251.5 321.4 ... 
Uganda 
Imports 385 265 4 0 
Exports 740 1152 0 0 
Zambia 
Imports 37736 41984 
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